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Abstract
Everyday tasks seldom involve isolate actions but sequences of them. We can see whether previous actions influence the
current one by exploring the response time to controlled sequences of stimuli. Specifically, depending on the response-
stimulus temporal interval (RSI), different mechanisms have been proposed to explain sequential effects in two-choice serial
response tasks. Whereas an automatic facilitation mechanism is thought to produce a benefit for response repetitions at
short RSIs, subjective expectancies are considered to replace the automatic facilitation at longer RSIs, producing a cost-
benefit pattern: repetitions are faster after other repetitions but they are slower after alternations. However, there is not
direct evidence showing the impact of subjective expectancies on sequential effects. By using a fixed sequence, the results
of the reported experiment showed that the repetition effect was enhanced in participants who acquired complete
knowledge of the order. Nevertheless, a similar cost-benefit pattern was observed in all participants and in all learning
blocks. Therefore, results of the experiment suggest that sequential effects, including the cost-benefit pattern, are the
consequence of automatic mechanisms which operate independently of (and simultaneously with) explicit knowledge of
the sequence or other subjective expectancies.
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Introduction
We unfold our actions within the context of other actions and
often we need to execute our action responses very fast. We know
that responses to series of stimuli presented at fast rates are affected
by the previous stimulus-response events (see [1] for a review).
According to the temporal interval between the response and the
next stimulus (RSI) and to the number of previous events that are
considered, different sequential effects can be observed. For
example, in two-choice serial response tasks with short RSI, it is
commonly observed a first-order repetition effect: response
repetitions are faster than response alternations. Simultaneously, a
higher-order repetition effect also emerges: responses, either
repetitions or alternations, are faster after repetitions [2–5].
Whereas the first-order repetition effect is supposed to rely on an
automaticfacilitation mechanism,based onthe memory trace of the
previous stimulus-response event [3,4], the higher-order repetition
effect is considered to reflect response-monitoring activity, which
would be higher for response alternations [6]. As memory traces
attenuate with time [2,6], the benefit for repetitions usually vanishes
at RSIs longer than 300 ms till the point that a repeating cost can
emerge, especially when spatial dimensions are involved (spatial
responses corresponding to the stimulus location; [4,6]). However,
when several previous events are considered, a cost-benefit pattern
is observed: response alternations are faster after other alternations
but they are slower after repetitions. Similarly, repetitions are faster
after other repetitions but they are slower after alternations.
Unlike the sequential effects at short RSIs, sequential effects
observed at long RSIs are usually considered to be caused by
subjective expectancies [3,4]. Subjective expectancies are com-
monly defined as strategic, top-down influences on motor reaction-
times [6–8]. Based on the distinction between passive or automatic
expectancies and active or conscious expectancies [9], sequential
effects observed at long RSIs are thought to be caused by active
variants of expectancy [10,11]. Subjective expectancies are
considered to be active because they take longer to develop than
the passive ones [7] and because only active expectancies are
thought to produce benefits for expected events and costs for
unexpected ones. That is, as suggested by [9], passive or automatic
expectancies produce processing benefits for expected events but
no costs for unexpected ones whereas active expectancies produce
both benefits and costs. Specifically, active expectancies in two-
choice random tasks have been often related to probabilistic
fallacies as the gamblers fallacy (the irrational belief that
alternations are more frequent than repetitions in random series
of two, equally likely events [3,8]) and the continuation of the run
fallacy (the irrational belief that local regularities, runs of either
repetitions or alternations, tend to continue [7]). See also [12] for
an introduction to these probabilistic fallacies.
Nevertheless, it remains unclear the extent to which sequential
effects at long RSIs are really caused by the subjective expectancy
hold by the participant. Some previous studies have analyzed the
impact of induced expectancies on sequential effects [11,13].
These studies reported that first-order sequential effects were not
modulated by such expectancies. Nevertheless, expectancies were
induced by means of instruction (i.e. asking participants to expect
either a repetition or an alternation) but participants knew that
alternations and repetitions were equally likely; so it was possible
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 May 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 5 | e5607that participants were holding different expectancies than the
experimentally intended ones. On the other hand, expectancies
have been manipulated in the context of a sequence learning task
[14]. However, in Soetens et als experiment only the stimuli
followed a probabilistic sequential pattern, being both responses
equally likely. Therefore, regarding the forthcoming stimulus-
response event, it was impossible to infer which expectancies
participants were holding. In a different but analogous paradigm,
Perruchet et al. [15] tried to discover the participants running
expectancy by asking them to make a judgment in each trial. In
their task, either tones alone or tones followed by a visual stimulus
(a square) were presented randomly. Participants had to respond
only in the latter case but always had to judge, before each trial,
the likelihood of the square being shown after the tone. Motor
responses were faster after several tone-square trials (in which the
response was required) and slower after several tone-alone trials (in
which the response had to be inhibited). In contrast, and according
to the gamblers fallacy, participants conscious expectancy of the
square increased with the length of the run of tone-alone trials and
decreased with the length of the run of tone-square trials.
Interestingly, the cost-benefit pattern observed in two-choice tasks
may also reflect a dissociation from active expectancies if the
gamblers fallacy held; whereas the gamblers fallacy would predict
an alternation after a long run of repetitions, it is, indeed, slower.
Nevertheless, asking the participants to report expectancies while
performing speeded responses makes matters more complicated.
In order to analyze the impact of active expectancies on
sequential effects, we used a fixed sequence learning task. If
participants were able to acquire complete knowledge of the
sequence, a reduction of the response costs should be observed
because all the events would be correctly expected. However, if
sequential effects as the cost-benefit pattern were inevitable, they
would be observed regardless of the ongoing subjective expectan-
cy. Furthermore, according to the level of knowledge acquired, the
sequence learning task allows identifying types of learners, making
the comparison between participants holding different subjective
expectancies possible. In previous experiments with a fixed two-
choice sequence, we found that knowledge modulated first-order
sequential effects [16,17]. Whereas participants who did not learn
the complete order responded faster to alternations than to
repetitions, no differences between transitions were observed in the
case of good learners. Unfortunately, analyses of higher-order
sequential effects were impossible as no repetition after another
repetition was presented (the repeating pattern was RLRRLLRL
R=Right, L=Left). Hence, to analyze if cost-benefit patterns
would appear regardless of knowledge, a sequence with longer
runs of repetitions was used in the present experiment. If, as has
been often suggested, the cost-benefit pattern was the consequence
of probabilistic fallacies, precise knowledge of the order would
attenuate or change this pattern. However, if the cost-benefit
pattern was caused by automatic mechanisms, it should be
observed regardless of the acquired knowledge.
Results
Each trial was classified according to the first-order (FO
repetition and FO alternation) and to the second-order transitions
(SO repetition and SO alternation). Hence, for example, response
to the last right stimulus in the pattern left-right-right was coded as
a first-order repetition (FO-R) and a second-order alternation (SO-
A). We also created the post-hoc factor Knowledge by assigning
participants to the Explicit group when they reproduced, at least
once, the complete sequence (elements and order) correctly and to
the Non-explicit otherwise. As the sequence was presented
continuously within a block, any starting point was considered
correct (e.g. RLRLRRRLLL; RRRLLLRLRL; RLRRRLLLRL).
Percentages of Explicit learners were 35% (8 out of 23) and 50% (7
out of 14) for short and long RSI conditions, respectively. Trials
with errors (2% in the explicit group and 5% in the non-explicit
group), following errors, and trials with RTs greater than 1000 ms
were dropped. The RT ANOVA with block (4 learning blocks),
FO (first-order repetitions and alternations) and SO (second-order
repetitions and alternations) as within-participant variables and
RSI (short and long) and Knowledge (Explicit and Non-explicit) as
between ones, showed the following effects:
Learning effects
Both the effects of block and Knowledge were significant
(F(3,99)=39.46 and F(1,33)=26.92, respectively, ps,.001) as well
as the block6Knowledge interaction (F(3,99)=18.69, p,.001).
Explicit learners responded faster than Non-explicit ones and
block was only reliable in the former group (F(3,39)=30.01,
p,.001), reflecting that only explicit learners responded increas-
ingly faster. Indeed, explicit learners anticipated almost all the
stimulus-response events in the last learning block (see Figure 1).
Sequential effects
The effects of SO and RSI were also significant (F(1,33)=30.48,
p,.001 and F(1,33)=10.42, p,.01, respectively). Globally, the
long RSI condition produced faster responses than the short RSI
one and responses after a repetition were faster than after an
alternation. RSI interacted with FO (F(1,33)=7.27, p,.01), with
SO (F(1,33)=9.11, p,.01) and with FO6SO (F(1,33)=7.37,
p,.01). FO was only significant in the long RSI condition
(F(1,12)=5.83, p,.05), reflecting a significant first-order alterna-
tion effect (see Figure 1). SO was reliable in both RSI conditions,
reflecting a global second-order repetition effect (see Figure 2).
However, it was stronger in the short RSI one (F(1,21)=32.79,
p,.01, and F(1,12)=8.01, p,.05; for short and long RSI
conditions, respectively). Also, the FO6SO interaction was
reliable in both conditions, although it was stronger in the long
RSI one (F(1,21)=16.99, p,.01, and F(1,12)=68.88, p,.001; for
short and long RSI conditions, respectively; see Figure 2). Hence,
the cost-benefit pattern was reliable in both RSI conditions and in
both groups of learners (see below).
The impact of explicit knowledge on sequential effects
Interestingly, Knowledge interacted with FO (F(1,33)=10.59,
p,.01) and the triple Knowledge6block6FO interaction was also
significant (F(3,99)=6.11, p,.01). FO was only significant in the
case of the Non-explicit group (F(1,20)=7.91, p,.05) and the
block6FO interaction was only reliable in the Explicit group
F(3,39)=5.95, p,.05). Whereas Non-explicit learners were faster
on alternations than on repetitions, a repetition effect emerged in
the last learning block in the case of the Explicit group
(F(1,13)=12.05, p,.01). This effect tended to be earlier in the
short RSI condition, though the triple RSI6FO6Knowledge was
not significant (see Figure 1). Crucially, the Knowledge factor did
not interact neither with SO nor with SO6FO (all Fs,1),
reflecting that second-order sequential effects were equivalent,
regardless of the type of expectancy (see Figure 2).
Random serial block
The RT ANOVA with the initial random block showed similar
patterns. RSI6FO and RSI6SO were significant (F(1,33)=5.98,
F(1,33)=5.26, respectively, ps,.05). FO was only significant in
the long RSI condition (F(1,12)=13.27, p,.01), showing a global
Influence of Past Events
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significant only in the short-RSI condition (F(1,21)=12.32,
p,.01); reflecting a significant second-order repetition effect in
this condition. The FO6SO interaction was globally significant
(F(1,33)=46.38, p,.001) and it did not interact with RSI (see
Figure 2).
Discussion
In line with previous studies on sequence learning [16,18,19]
results of the reported experiment showed a high correlation
between performance and explicit knowledge. Participants who
acquired complete knowledge of the order responded faster and
more accurately than non-explicit learners. The effect of
knowledge was clearly demonstrated by the tendency of explicit
learners to make correct anticipations in the final learning blocks.
In spite of this anticipatory activity, second-order sequential
dependencies were observed in all the participants. Specifically,
the cost-benefit pattern varied neither through learning blocks, nor
between groups of learners. As shown in Figure 2, both groups
showed facilitation for repetitions after another repetition in both
RSI conditions. Furthermore, in the long RSI condition, both
groups showed repetition costs after an alternation. Provided that
explicit learners were not holding any irrational probabilistic
Figure 1. Reaction time means in milliseconds for each block, split by first-order transition. Top: long-RSI condition. Bottom: short-RSI
condition. Right: Non-explicit groups. Left: Explicit groups (R - random block).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005607.g001
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Alternation) and Knowledge-group (Explicit and Non-Explicit) in the initial random block (Random) in the initial sequence block
(Initial) and in the final sequence block (Final). Top: long-RSI condition. Bottom: short-RSI condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005607.g002
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automatic mechanisms. The first-order repetition effect was
observed neither in the global RTs analyses nor in the short
RSI condition. It could be argued that the fixed pattern was biased
towards the alternation response (it contained 60% of alterna-
tions), explaining thus the absence of the repetition effect.
However, the same result was observed in the initial random
block, where both transitions were equally likely. Furthermore, the
repetition effect increased through the learning phase in the case of
Explicit learners. In line with this finding, the repetition effect has
not been always observed [3,10,20] suggesting that it may be
vulnerable to certain individual differences and/or specific
experimental procedures. Furthermore, the experiments showing
the repetition effect have usually more trials than in the reported
one [4,5]. In contrast to the delay in the expression of the
repetition effect, non-explicit learners showed an alternation effect,
together with a cost-benefit pattern, since the initial random block.
The alternation bias was also observed in the percentage of errors;
10% of the times in which a repetition was required after an
alternation, another alternation was produced. It is worth noting
that these erroneous responses, though less frequent in the explicit
group (5%), were not totally overcome, suggesting an underlying
conflict between the correct explicit prediction for a repetition and
the automatic tendency to prepare the alternate response after
another alternation. The fact that this tendency was expressed very
early (the same pattern was observed in both RSI conditions) and
that, regarding RT, had the same impact on both groups of
participants, suggests that automatic mechanisms rather than
active or strategic expectancies (e.g. the gamblers fallacy: [3,7,8])
may be involved. Based on time course constraints, and when
spatial stimuli are involved, this mechanism could be related to the
inhibition of return phenomenon (see also [21] for a similar
proposal). As in the present findings, the inhibition of return
changes to a benefit for repetition after a repetition of the same
location. Interestingly, using other visuomotor tasks, it has also
been shown that previous trial history, rather than knowledge of
the future, determines automatic preparation processes [22].
In conclusion, the reported results showed that knowledge of
future events does not override the influence of past events, neither
at short nor at long RSI. Specifically, memory of the previous
pattern (repetition or alternation) had an automatic effect on
performance, regardless of the explicit knowledge of the sequence.
To this point, these results challenge the idea of a strategic or
active nature of the expectancies producing the cost-benefit
pattern. Rather, they clearly showed the involvement of automatic
pattern detector mechanisms (see also [23]) which, as shown in the
present data, operate independently of (and simultaneously with)
the acquired knowledge or other subjective expectancies.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
Written consent was obtained from each participant prior to the
experiment. The experiment was approved by the local ethics
committee of the University of Barcelona.
Participants
A total of 37 students from the University of Barcelona
participated as a requisite for extra course credits. Participants
were randomly distributed to the long and to the short RSI
conditions (14 and 23, respectively; Only a few participants were
able to learn the complete sequence in the short RSI condition.
Hence, in order to have more participants in the explicit group, we
had to increase the sample). The Knowledge factor was created
post-hoc from the analyses of the final test given to the participants
(see procedure).
The task
A white X (0,5 cm high) on a black background, was presented
either 3.0 cm to the left or to the right from the centre of the
screen of a compatible IBM PC. The spatial position of the
stimulus corresponded to the left and right responses, which were
operated with left and right index fingers, respectively. In the fixed
sequence blocks the stimuli were presented according to the
repeating pattern introduced above (RLRRRLLLRL; R: Right
stimulus-response; L: Left stimulus-response). The stimulus was on
the screen till the response. RSI was 50 ms in the short RSI
condition and 500 ms in the long one.
Procedure
Participants were assigned randomly to either the short or long
RSI conditions. They were instructed to respond with the button
corresponding to the location of the letter X as fast and as
accurately as possible. Participants received incidental instructions,
that is, the repeating pattern was not mentioned and the
experiment was introduced as one of exploring the effect of
training on RT. The sequence learning task was formed by 4
blocks of 180 trials each. Brief pauses were introduced between
blocks. In addition, in order to analyze till which point the
sequential effects would be comparable to random presentations, a
random block, including also 180 trials, was introduced before the
sequence learning task. Finally, participants were informed of the
repeating pattern and they were asked to reproduce the sequence
twice, without the visual stimuli, using the same response keys.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: ET JLM. Performed the
experiments: ET JLM. Analyzed the data: ET JLM. Contributed
reagents/materials/analysis tools: ET JLM. Wrote the paper: ET JLM.
References
1. Fecteau JH, Munoz DP (2003) Exploring the consequences of the previous trial.
Nat Rev Neurosci 4: 435–443.
2. Bertelson P (1965) Serial choice reaction-time as a function of response versus
signal-and-response repetition. Nature 206: 217–218.
3. Kirby NH (1976) Sequential effects in two-choice reaction time: automatic
facilitation or subjective expectancy? J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform 2:
567–577.
4. Soetens E, Boer LC, Hueting JE (1985) Expectancy or automatic facilitation?
separating sequential effects in two-choice reaction time. Journal of Experimen-
tal Psychology: Human Perception & Performance 11: 598–616.
5. Soetens E, Notebaert W (2005) Response monitoring and expectancy in random
serial rt tasks. Acta Psychol (Amst) 119: 189–216.
6. Kirby NH (1980) Sequential effects in choice reaction time. London Academic
Press.
7. Soetens E (1998) Localizing sequential effects in serial choice reaction time with
the information reduction procedure. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Human Perception and Performance 24: 547–568.
8. Smulders SFA, Notebaert W, Meijer M, Crone EA, van der Molen MW, et al.
(2005) Sequential effects on speeded information processing: a developmental
study. J Exp Child Psychol 90: 208–234.
9. Kahneman D, Tversky A (1982) Variants of uncertainty. New York: Cambridge
University Press, chapter Judgement under undertainty: heuristics and biases.
10. Jentzsch I, Sommer W (2002) Functional localization and mechanisms of
sequential effects in serial reaction time tasks. Percept Psychophys 64:
1169–1188.
11. Jentzsch I, Sommer W (2002) The effect of intentional expectancy on mental
processing: a chronopsychophysiological investigation. Acta Psychol (Amst) 111:
265–282.
Influence of Past Events
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 May 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 5 | e560712. Ayton P, Fisher I (2004) The hot hand fallacy and the gambler’s fallacy: two
faces of subjective randomness? Memory and Cognition 32: 1369–1378.
13. Matt J, Leuthold H, Sommer W (1992) Differential effects of voluntary
expectancies on reaction times and event-related potentials: evidence for
automatic and controlled expectancies. J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn 18:
810–822.
14. Soetens E, Melis A, Notebaert W (2004) Sequence learning and sequential
effects. Psychol Res 69: 124–137.
15. Perruchet P, Cleeremans A, Destrebecqz A (2006) Dissociating the effects of
automatic activation and explicit expectancy on reaction times in a simple
associative learning task. J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn 32: 955–965.
16. Tubau E, Lo ´pez-Moliner J (2004) Spatial interference and response control in
sequence learning: the role of explicit knowledge. Psychological Research 68:
55–63.
17. Tubau E, Hommel B, Lo ´pez-Moliner J (2007) Modes of executive control in
sequence learning: from stimulus-based to plan-based control. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General 136: 43–63.
18. Eliassen JC, Souza T, Sanes JN (2001) Human brain activation accompanying
explicitly directed movement sequence learning. Experimental Brain Research
141: 269–280.
19. Hoffmann J, Koch I (1997) stimulus-response compatibility and sequential
learning in the serial reaction time task. Psychol Res 60: 87–97.
20. Melis A, Soetens E, van der Molen MW (2002) Process-specific slowing with
advancing age: evidence derived from the analysis of sequential effects. Brain
Cogn 49: 420–435.
21. Fecteau JH, Au C, Armstrong IT, Munoz DP (2004) Sensory biases produce
alternation advantage found in sequential saccadic eye movement tasks. Exp
Brain Res 159: 84–91.
22. Whitwell RL, Lambert LM, Goodale MA (2008) Grasping future events: explicit
knowledge of the availability of visual feedback fails to reliably influence
prehension. Exp Brain Res 188: 603–611.
23. Huettel SA, Mack PB, McCarthy G (2002) Perceiving patterns in random series:
dynamic processing of sequence in prefrontal cortex. Nat Neurosci 5: 485–490.
Influence of Past Events
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 May 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 5 | e5607